Bahujan Samaj Party’s rout in Uttar Pradesh assembly elections in terms of seats has sparked a discussion on its future. The debate is centred, and rightly so, not on whether BSP will survive in U.P. but on what are its prospects beyond this state. About 26% vote share that it has received in just concluded assembly elections in U.P. indicates its strong organization and equally strong core support base in the form of Dalit population in the state. In terms of electoral calculations, it is forgone conclusion that BSP will make a strong comeback in the state sooner than later, if disenchantment grows against the incumbent S.P. government.
However, one must raise few questions with regard to BSP’s dependence on TINA (there is no alternative) factor in case of anti-incumbency wave. Should BSP be satisfied with once in-once out kind of electoral arrangement in the state? If Left had ruled in West Bengal for uninterrupted 34 years, and, thus, maintained whopping 40% vote share in the state at a time of its worst electoral debacle, what prevents the BSP in making such bold attempts in Uttar Pradesh? Many expected that Mayawateeji would defeat the anti-incumbency logic based on her administrative performance and social engineering. While her administrative skills are appreciated even by her critics, this can never be a sufficient condition for an incumbent government to win the election, particularly where nature of the State essentially remains in the domain of development and social welfare. This implies that the government should initiate and successfully implement certain welfare schemes that would benefit cross sections of social segments in the state. Even though, BSP has maintained that its government was in the interest of Sarvajan, election results showed that there was hardly any programme that had left its impression on non-Dalit population in the state.
In the case of social engineering, it could be interpreted by U.P. election results that political coalition of social forces purely based on caste identities could become counter-productive. In 2007, even though BSP benefitted by Dalit-Brahmin combination, it was the Brahmin population that was empowered in terms of vote bank. It’s obvious that such empowered community would demand its pound of flesh, and no matter what it gets would remain unsatisfied, and shift loyalties in next elections. However, if Mayawateeji would have succeeded in implementing programmes beneficial to the poor in the state, there could have been divisions among Brahmin ranks and file to the advantage of BSP. The long term social engineering needs to be based on socio-economic conditions within the community identity. BSP is not alien to such formula in Uttar Pradesh as it has definitely been enjoying substantial support of lower rank OBCs in the state. Similarly, BSP would benefit if it shows consistency in taking up the social and economic issues of OBCs among the Muslims. The OBC Muslims, like the lower rank Hindu OBCs, are natural ally of BSP. Thus, a meaningful and sustainable social engineering, with Dalit in its core, can take place if BSP pays attention to aligning with socially and/or economically deprived segments in other social communities. In Bihar, Nitish Kumar has certainly succeeded in creating similar kind of social coalition in support of his government in the state. However, he also lacks to offer an economic programme for this coalition, which has come into existence in an attempt to assert their identities against established dominant political formation of resourceful OBCs and upper-caste Muslims in the state.
While such a coalition of deprived sections is desirable and achievable in Uttar Pradesh, the Kanshiramji’s party is far away from attracting non-Dalit social groups into its fold in other states. There are several reasons for this. First, the alarmed Congress and BJP have made it a point to provide considerable representation to Dalit leadership in party organizations, state machinery and ministries in respective states to prevent BSP from cashing on en-block Dalit votes. Second, BSP has not evolved a tactic to adjust in the regions, like western and central India, where Dalits have converted to Buddhism in large numbers. There is a trust deficit between BSP leadership and neo-Buddhist which has become a stumbling block for BSP to grow in these regions. Third, BSP’s inability to develop Mayawatee-like strong leaderships in other states adds to lack of its credibility as a formative political force in respective states. Fourth, BSP’s apathy towards intellectuals, even those sympathetic to it, is not helping it in any way as the politics remains argumentative in India at many levels. However, BSP’s unwillingness to develop and demand an alternative to existing political and economic system in the country is the main hurdle in its growth at national level. The incumbent political and economic system has been designed to maintain hegemony of dominant social forces in the country as represented by Congress and BJP at the national level. Political fight against Congress and BJP requires struggle for radical structural changes in the realms of economics and political system. Without taking up several issues related to it, like electoral reforms or distribution of excessive wealth, it would not be possible for BSP or any other forces to rally the deprived sections behind it. The present system, with all its positives, only permits existence of diverse political options but would not allow shaping up of credible alternative to Congress or BJP at the national level.
Lenin’s saying that ‘Without revolutionary theory, there can not be a revolutionary movement,’ applies to all the forces that wish to bring in fundamental changes in human society to achieve equality, dignity and progress. Any political formation showing the mettle to develop such a revolutionary theory in Indian context has the future, be it BSP, SP or the Left, although this road is most arduous and least chosen.
